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THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBLE
REMOVAL OF SCOTT
KATHLEEN MORRIS
LYNN C.

COUNTY

ATTORNEY,

R.

OLSON*

On March 8, 1985, a Petition to Remove Scott County
Attorney R. Kathleen Morris from office was filed with the
Governor of Minnesota. 1 The Petition was signed by Cindy Lee
Buchan, who had been a defendant in a child sex abuse case in
Scott County. 2 While Minnesota law requires only a single
signature on a petition, 3 this petition contained approximately 3000
supporting signatures.
Scott County is located south of the Minneapolis-Saint Paul
metropolitan area. In 1983 and 1984 the Scott County Attorney,
R. Kathleen Morris, charged twenty-four persons with child sexual
abuse. Of the twenty-four charged, one pled guilty and was used as
a State's witness, and later was sentenced to prison. Two of the
defendants were acquitted in a much-publicized trial in September
of 1984. Ms. Morris dismissed all charges against the remaining
twenty-one defendants on October 15, 1984.
The charges aimed at Ms. Morris in the removal Petition
included allegations that she caused the arrest of citizens while
*The Honorable Lynn C. Olson graduated from Michigan State University (B.A. 196) and
WVilliam Mitchell College of Law (J.D. 1977). She has studid at Ccntres F,uro prles laogit's et
Civilsations (Certificate" Moyan" 1962), Columbia University (1964), University of Illinois (1966),
and National Judicial College (1982). Judge Olson has served as an Anoka County Court Judge
(1982) and as an Assistant County Attorney in Anoka County, Minnesota (1979). In 1980-82, Judge
Olson was an associate in the Steltiji, Munstenteiger Law Firm. Anoka, Minnesota. Shc is
president-elect (1987-88) of the Minnesota Judges Association, and was appointed by the Chief
.Justice ofthe Minnesota Supreme Court to th .Judicial Appeal Pan' (1985 i presen)..Judge Olson
is a it'inlir of' the Long Range Planning Cosiiniiie. and the National C',onrl'ene Planning
Comanmittee of the National Association of Women Judges.
I . See Petition to Remove R. Kathleen Morris From (it Office of Scot Couty Altwnvy (March
8, 1985) [hereinafter Petition to Remove].
2. See id. at 5.
3. Minn. Op. Au'y Gen. No. 475-B (Sept. 26. 1945).
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knowing there was insufficient probable cause to justify the
issuance of criminal complaints, and that she caused the forcible
removal of children as young as eighteen months of age from their
parents' home, while knowing there was insufficient probable cause
establishing the necessity of the children's removal. 4 The Petition
also charged Ms. Morris with the development of false allegations
by children of sexual abuse, the secreting and suppressing of
evidence, the destruction of material evidence, the suborning of
perjury, misrepresentations to the court, and intentional violations
5
of court orders .
The Minnesota Attorney General's Office reviewed this
Petition and advised the Governor that the Petition in itself was
sufficient to trigger the removal hearings pursuant to sections
351.03 and 351.04 of the Minnesota Statutes. 6 Section 351.03
provided that the governor may remove from office any county
official who appears, upon competent evidence, to be guilty of
malfeasance or nonfeasance, after first giving the official an
opportunity for a hearing in his or her defense. 7 Section 351.04
required the governor to "appoint a special commissioner to take
and report the testimony for and against [the county official] to be
used on the hearing. "8
It was the rare person in the State of Minnesota at this point
who did not have an opinion about R. Kathleen Morris. The state
population appeared to be about as evenly divided for and against
Ms. Morris and her actions as it had ever been on any issue in the
state. In a statewide poll taken by the Minneapolis Star and
4. Petition to Remove, supra note 1, at 1-2.
5. Id. at 2-4.
6. MINN. S'rAr. SS 351.03-04 (repealed 1986).
provided:

Section 351.03 of thc Minnesota Statutes

The governor may remove from oflice any clerk of the supreme court or a district
court, Judge of probate, Judge of any municipal court, justice of the peace, court
commissioner, sheriff, constable, (oroner, auditor, register ofdeceds, county altorney,
county superintendent of schools, county commissioner, county treasurer, or any
collector, receiver, or custodian of public moneys, when it appears to him by
competent evidence, that either has been guilty of mallhasance or non-feasancc in the
l)erformanee of his oflfeial duties; first giving to such officer a copy of the charges
against him and an opportunity to be heard in his defense.
Id. 351.03. Section 351.04 of the Minnesota Statutes provided: "When charges are mate against any
such officer, the governor shall appoint a special commissioner to take and report the testimony 6or
and against him to be used on the hearing. Each witness shall subscribe his name to his testimtony
when the same is reduted to writing." Id. § 351.04. Subsequent to the proceedings involving
Kathleen Morris, the Minnesota Legislature repealed 351.03 and -. 04, and adopted a new procedure
for the removal of elected county officials. See id. § 351.14-23 (1986)(setting forth statutory scheme
for removal of elected county officials). For a discussion of SS 351.14-.23, see infra notes 131-34 and
accompanying text.
7. Id. § 351.03. For the text ot' 351.03, seetsupra note 6.
8. Id. 5 351.04. For the text of § 351.04, see supra note 6.
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Tribune, just before hearings commenced, there were few
Minnesotans who had "no opinion" on this issue. 9 Additionally,
Ms. Morris' attorney had raised the spectre of sexism, and cries of
"witch hunt" could be heard from Ms. Morris' supporters. Not
only would this hearing be a difficult legal case, but it was also
rapidly becoming a politically explosive one.
As a female district court judge in a district north of the
metropolitan area of Minneapolis-Saint Paul, I was far removed
from the problems being encountered in Scott County until Governor Perpich requested me to serve as special commissioner pursuant to section 351.04 of the Minnesota Statutes. 10 I accepted the
Governor's request to serve as special commissioner with some
anxiety and concern, but with confidence that Ms. Morris would
receive a fair hearing.
While pursuant to Minnesota state statutes only one
commissioner may formally hear the charges and report to the
governor on a petition to remove a county official, 1 the
Governor appointed two other people to serve as assistants to the
Commissioner.' 2 The first was Julius Gernes, a highly respected
county attorney for Winona County. 3 Mr. Gernes was a member
of the Lawyer's Professional Responsibility Board and treasurer of
the Minnesota County Attorney's Association. The second was
Irene Scott, the first woman to become a partner in a major
Minneapolis law firm. 14 Ms. Scott has been a practicing attorney
since 1952 and was one of the original members of the State Ethical
Practices Board.
Upon appointment of this Commission, the Governor stated
he would leave the establishment of all times, dates, and procedures
of the hearings to the Commission, and would look to me to make a
clear recommendation to the Governor upon completion of the
hearings. His final statement increased my anxiety. He stated, "I
would expect to follow that recommendation. "
The Governor asked the Attorney General to select legal
counsel to present evidence to the Commission.' 5 Attorney
General Hubert H. Humphrey III did this by appointing an
independent counsel, Kelton Gage, from Mankato, Minnesota.
Mr. Gage was a former president of the Minnesota Bar
9. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, May 19, 1985, at IA, col. 1.
10.( ,e MINN. SrAr. §351.04 (1986). For the text of.S 351.04, see supra note 6.
I. See id.
12. See Minn. Exec. Order No. 85-10 at 2 (1985).
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id.
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Association. He had also served as a member of the Lawyer's
Professional Responsibility Board, and as special counsel to the
Board on Judicial Standards investigating charges of misconduct
against judges.
The appointment of the Commission by the Governor was
made on March 25, 1985.16 We had to determine a variety of legal
issues, as well as proper procedure and the proper type of hearing.
The last recorded removal hearing in Minnesota was in 1941,17
and, including that case, there had been only four removal cases
since sections 351.03 and 351.04 of the Minnesota Statutes were
passed in 1881.18
It was clear that we needed assistance to complete the
necessary research. Initially, the Governor had anticipated that the
Attorney General would appoint a special counsel who would work
for the Commission. Since the special counsel was to present
evidence,' 9 however, we believed that the special counsel was in a
somewhat prosecutorial role. Therefore, it seemed inappropriate to
have Mr. Gage also advising the Commission. Since we were to be
the factfinders, we decided we must remain at arm's length from
Mr. Gage, dealing with him only in the presence of the attorneys
for the Petitioner and for Ms. Morris.
Our need for a law clerk or attorney to serve us, however, was
obvious, given all the research needed before we could even
commence planning the hearing itself. The governor's office set
up a fund for such a staff person. Kim Mesun, my law clerk, was
20
then able to serve as a part-time attorney for the Commission.
The procedural issues facing us were as difficult as they were
numerous. Decisions had to be made regarding whether the
hearing should be open or closed and whether the evidence should
be presented in an adversarial style. We also had to determine
whether administrative rules were sufficient or if the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence should apply in order to obtain the statutory
requirement of "competent evidence.''21 The scope of media
coverage, including allowance of television cameras in the hearing,
16. Id. at 3.
17. See In reOlson, 211 Minn. 114, 300 N.W. 398 (1941).
18. See id.; In reMason, 147 Minn. 383, 181 N.W. 570 (1920); State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist,
141 Minn. 308, 170 N.W. 201 (1918); State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313, 133 N.W.
857 (1911).

19. See Minn. Exec. Order No. 85-10 at 2 (1985) (Attorney General to appoint counsel to
organize and present evidence to the Commission).
20. Kim Mesun's immediate assignment included researching the Commission's subpeona

power and the definitions of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. She was also to complete
briefs on all Minnesota removal cases.
21. See MINN. STAT. S 351.03 (repealed 1986) (governor can remove county officials upon
coumpetent evidence). For the text of 5 351.03, see supra note 6.
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would also be decided. An additional major concern was the
question of discovery. We were already being asked what, if any,
limitations would be set. For example, it was not clear whether
discovery should be limited to statements made in the Petition or
whether children should be deposed. Finally, we needed to
establish some time table as the pressure was immense to begin this
hearing as soon as possible.
To begin to answer some of the questions posed, we reviewed
the Minnesota precedent dealing with removal procedures. The
first case, State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart,22 involved a county
attorney, John Kinsella. In Eberhart a petition for removal
was filed against Kinsella, charging that he was guilty of
malfeasance and nonfeasance. 23 Kinsella allegedly had refused and
neglected to advise the county commissioners on certain
24
matters and had failed to prosecute violations of the liquor law.
Furthermore, seven indictments had been returned against him for
libel and circulating obscene literature. 25 After evidence was taken,
26
the governor removed Kinsella from office.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the governor's
actions and noted that the terms malfeasance and nonfeasance have
no technical meaning. 27 The supreme court stated that conviction
of a crime was not essential, and that general incompetency and
neglect of duty constituted sufficient grounds for removal. 2 The
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support
29
Kinsella's removal from office.
In 1918, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was again faced
with whether a removal was proper in State ex rel. Martin v.
Burnquist.3 0 In Burnquist a petition was presented to the governor
for removal of a county probate judge who, it was alleged, made
antiwar and pro-Germany statements during the time that the
United States was at war with Germany. 3 1 The court stated that the
misconduct complained of must have some connection with the
performance of the judge's official duties in order to remove him
from office. 3 2 The court determined that the county probate judge's
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

116 Minn. 313, 133 N.W. 857 (1911).
State ex rd. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313, 314, 133 N.W. 857, 858 (1911).
Id. at 321, 133 N.W. at 860.
Id.
Id. at 314, 133 N.W. at 858.
Id. at 322, 133 N.W. at 861.
Id.
Id.
141 Minn. 308, 170 N.W. 201 (1918).
State exrel. Martin v. Burnquist, 141 Minn. 308, 320, 170 N.W. 201, 202 (1918).
&,.at 322, 170 N.W. at 203.
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statements had no relation to the performance of his duties, and
33
therefore concluded that there was no basis for removal.
The third and probably the most interesting of all the removal
cases, In re Mason, 34 involved a petition to remove Hennepin
County Attorney William Nash. 35 In Mason Nash was charged with
receiving bribes and conspiring with persons to receive, transport,
36
and conceal intoxicating liquor during the prohibition period.
Nash had been criminally charged in a United States federal court
with this offense. 37 The removal petition was later amended to
include additional allegations that Nash received a rather large
bribe for using his official position to prevent someone from being
brought before the Grand Jury of Hennepin County, and that he
received an even larger bribe for seeing to it that four prostitutes
38
would receive only fines and no prison sentences.
After an extended hearing, the governor determined that the
allegations were true and that the county attorney's conduct
constituted malfeasance. 39 Therefore, the governor made an order
removing Nash from the office of county attorney.4 0 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota reviewed the removal proceedings and
determined that there was substantial evidence supporting the
removal decision.4 1 The court further determined that there was no
statutory basis for not allowing more than one set of charges to be
considered in the decision and no reason why the petition could not
be amended to include additional charges which, if proved, would
have a direct and material bearing on the removal question.4 2 The
court concluded that there was a substantial basis for the
governor's decision, and therefore affirmed the removal decision. 43

33. Id. at 322-23, 170 N.W. at 203.
34. 147 Minn. 383, 181 N.W. 570 (1920)).
35. In re Mason, 147 Minn. 383,385, 181 N.W. 570), 571 (1920).
36. Id.
37. Id.
)
38. Id. at 385-86, 181 N.W. at 571.
39. Id. at 385, 181 N.W. at 571.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 390, 181 N.W. at 573. The Sulpreaiic Court of Miinnesola noteh
at (he rcI-toval
power is granted to the governor by an act of the legislature, and thus is not an exercise of power
which the state constitution vests in the governor as chief executive office of the state. Id. at 385.
181 N.W. at 571. Since the removal action is not an exercise of executive power by the governor, the
action is subject t) review by the court. Id (citing State ex rel. Kinsella v. EIxrhart, 116 Miln. 3113
320-21, 133 N.W. 857, 860 (1911)).
42. Id. at 387, 181 N.W. at 572. In addition to detcrjiing that inore lian onile set it'chargs
could be considered in (ht, reoitival decision, Ihe court dtetttitn dlthat proofo o" tllet'scs hit thant
those charged in the petition which were similar in nature to the offenses charged was admissible to
show a general scheme or course of conduct for purposes of corroboration. Id. at 390, 181 N.W. at
573.
43. Id. at 391. 181 N.W. at 573-74.
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The most recent Minnesota removal case, In re Olson,44
involved a petition to remove Scott County Sheriff Arthur
45
Mesenbrink for nonfeasance in the performance of official duty.
In Olson Mesenbrink was charged with failure to prosecute
violations of the gambling laws. 4 6 The governor removed
Mesenbrink from the office of Sheriff of Scott County. 47 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed whether there was a
reasonable or substantial basis for the removal.4 8 The court stated
that a public office is created for the benefit of the public, and the
duties imposed on the officeholder are functions and attributes of
the office which must be performed.4 9 The court determined that
the sheriff had a duty to enforce the laws and that his failure to
pursue open and notorious gambling violations was a substantial
neglect of that duty.5 0 The court concluded that the governor had a
substantial basis for removing Mesenbrink from the office of
sheriff, and therefore affirmed the removal order. 5 1
There was not a great deal of consistency in the procedures
followed in the four cases, but the adversarial nature was evident
from the reading of three of the briefs found in the state archives. In
each of the three cases the state attorney general acted as a
prosecutor and the elected official had his own attorney who acted
as a defense attorney. Both attorneys made arguments and
conducted direct and cross examination.
Based upon the adversarial nature of the precedent previously
discussed and today's standards of due process, the Commission
determined that it would be fair to conduct the hearing in the
milieu with which we were all familiar. Further, we determined
that the Minnesota District Court Trial Rules and the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence should apply, rather than the Administrative
Rules. It appeared that this was the only way the requirement
of section 351.03 of the Minnesota Statutes for "competent
evidence" could be assured. 52
After we determined which rules to apply during the removal
process, we considered what standard of proof should be applied.
Since this was a civil proceeding as opposed to a criminal
44. 211 Minn. 114, 300 N.W. 398 (1941).
45. In re Olson, 211 Minn' 114, 115, 300 N.W. 398, 399(1941).
46. Id. at 116, 300 N.W. at 399.
47. Id. at 115, 300 N.W. at 399.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 117-18, 300 N.W. at 400.
50. Id. at 119, 300 N.W. at 400.
51. Id.
52. See MINN. S'rAr. S 351.03 (repealed 1986) (allowing dismissal of county otticials upon
competent evidence of nonfeasance or malfeasance). For the text of ' 351.03, se' supra note 6.
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proceeding, it was obvious that the standard need not be proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. We looked to the Minnesota Rules of
Board on Judicial Standards as well as the Minnesota Rules of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility.5 3 We determined that
pursuant to both rules the clear and convincing standard is applied,
as opposed to preponderance of the evidence. 5 4 Thus, considering
the consequences of removal to be similar to that of disbarment, the
Commission determined it should establish the use of the standard
55
of clear and convincing evidence.
As we began to set our time table for discovery, a prehearing
conference, and the hearing date itself, we began to run into a
variety of difficulties. Basically, the problems all seemed to stem
from the fact that Ms. Morris had also been sued in federal court by
some of the former defendants in the child sex abuse cases. The
discovery in the federal civil lawsuits was proceeding at the same
time we were trying to commence the removal hearing against Ms.
Morris. Because the federal lawsuit was so complex, and because
many other individuals besides Ms. Morris had been brought in as
defendants, numerous potential witnesses were unwilling to give
voluntary statements to Mr. Gage. Consequently, he applied to the
Commission for subpoena power and the procedure for obtaining
such subpoenas.
A telephone conference was held on May 6, 1985, wherein
Mr. Gage argued for obtaining an order for issuance of subpoenas.
Mr. Stephen Doyle, Ms. Morris' attorney, strongly argued against
allowing subpoenas, stating that there was not authority under the
law and that historically subpoenas had not been used in removal
hearings. Mr. Doyle further argued that by having subpoena
power, he would feel obliged to take depositions as well and that
would further prolong the removal proceedings. Mr. Doyle also
argued that the taking of depositions was really unnecessary, since
the information had already accumulated and had been heard for a
number of years in the media, and therefore there was no reason to
go beyond what was already known.
53. See MINNESOTA Rui.Fs OF BOARD ON JUoICIAL SrANDARDS (1985); MINNE-:SOTA Rui.Fs OF
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAi. RESPONSIBIi.rrY (1985, amended 1987).
54. See MINNEsorA RULES OF BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS Rule 10(c)(2)(1985)(loard has
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence ihe facts justifying aclion); MINNESOTA RUlEs OF
LAWYERS PROFESSIoNAl. RESPONSIBI.IrY Rule 9(h)(1)(1985) (amended 1987)(panel of board should
affirm admonition to lawyer if supported by clear and convincing evidence).
55. Subsequent to the hearings pertaining to R. Kathleen Morris, the Minnesota Legislature
codified the "'lear and convincing" standard fIor removal hearings. MINN. SrA'r. S 351.19
1 (2) (1986) (special master shall determine whether the petitioners proved by clear and cabvincing
evidence the factual allegations of malfeasance or nonfeasance). For a discussion of the subsequently
adopted removal proceedings, see infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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On May 8, 1985, I signed an order establishing a
procedure for obtaining subpoenas by application to the Clerk of
District Court for Ramsey County. The Commission relied upon
rule 45.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows
the clerk of the district court to issue subpoenas. 56 We also used as a
basis an 1892 case which dealt with the temporary suspension of a
57
county treasurer while the removal action was proceeding. The
the
court allowed the treasurer to obtain subpoenas to compel
58
attendance of witnesses on his behalf at the removal hearing.
Furthermore, we found a 1942 Minnesota Attorney General's
opinion which, although involving a hearing under the Veterans
Preference Act before a county board, seemed to adequately
address our specific subpoena problem.5 9 As part of the discussion,
the attorney general stated: "The right to a fair hearing implies
the right to compel the attendance of witnesses. That right might
become a mockery if the [Respondent] were not entitled to compel
the attendance of witnesses.... If he has that right, of course the
county board should have a corresponding right.''60 Another
Minnesota Attorney General opinion in 1944 stated that a referee
in a proceeding to remove a county sheriff had the power to compel
61
the attendance of witnesses before him.
On May 13, 1985, Ms. Morris and the Scott County Sheriff
and Deputy Sheriffs served upon me an order to show cause,
affidavit, notice of motion and motion, and a summons and
complaint. The moving papers alleged that the order of Special
Commissioner Olson permitting the use of subpoenas to compel
witnesses to give testimony was contrary to law and contrary to the
executive order.
The complaint by Ms. Morris and the deputies appeared to
protest the power of subpoena only when related to compelling
56. MINN. R. Civ. PRo. 45.05. Rule 45.05 provides as fI'llows:
At the request of any party, the clerk of the district court shall issue subpoenas for
winesses in all civil cases pending befire that court, or before any magistrate,
arbitrator,' board, committee, or other person authorized to examine witnesses. A
subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a hearing or trial may be served at
any place within the state.

id.
57. See State ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, 50 Minn. 239, 244, 52 N.W. 655, 655 (1892).
58. Id. at 247, 52 N.W. at 656.
59. SeeMinn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-F (Mar. 6, 1942), reprinted in Report of*Attorney GeneralMinnesota No. 119 (1942).
60. Id.
61. See Minn. Op. At'y Gen. No. 144-B-24 (Jan. 22, 1944), reprinted in Report o Attorney
General-Minnesota No. 68 (1944). The basis for the opinion was a predecessor statute to the present
Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.; see also MINN. SrAr. 5 596.01 (repealed 1974) (clerk shall issue
subpoena to compel testimony of witnesses); MINN. R. Civ. PRO. 45 (1986) (subpoena shall be issued
ly clerk ol*('(urt to commaml person to testify).
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attendance at prehearing depositions as opposed to compelling
attendance at the hearing itself. In her prayer for relief, Ms. Morris
asked for an order temporarily restraining the Commission's
counsel from proceeding with prehearing depositions, and
quashing all subpoenas and deposition notices. She also requested
that the order permanently enjoin the Commission from initiating
any form of prehearing discovery procedures, and declare and
adjudge that defendants' and Commission's counsel not have the
power to order or authority to proceed with a prehearing discovery
in proceedings initiated to remove Ms. Morris from office. Lastly,
Ms. Morris requested an order declaring and adjudging that the
defendants have no power or authority to cause subpoenas to be
issued in connection with the prehearing depositions, or in
connection with the compelling of witnesses to give testimony at the
hearing itself.
The specific motion filed in Ramsey County District Court
before the Honorable Harold Schultz on May 14, 1985, was
brought by five witnesses who had been served notice for depositions by Mr. Gage. The movants sought to quash subpoenas which
required them to give prehearing deposition testimony in
connection with the proceedings to remove Ms. Morris from
office. Judge Schultz, having heard all of the arguments of counsel,
then ruled from the bench and denied the motion.
Judge Schultz not only denied the motions, but also denied
a motion for the stay of the order pending the plaintiff's
Petition for Writ of Prohibition. Certain witnesses seemed
particularly concerned because they were also named defendants in
seven pending civil damage actions in a multimillion dollar lawsuit
brought by seven sets of ex-defendants in the Scott County criminal
sex abuse cases. These defendants had filed summary judgment
motions or dismissal motions upon the grounds of their qualified
good faith immunity and, therefore, did not believe they should be
subjected to the burden and expense of discovery procedures in the
removal hearings prior to the adjudication of their motions in
federal court. 62
An interesting problem appeared when these matters were
heard in district court, and in the supreme court of Minnesota.
The question presented was who was to defend and argue the
subpoena issue for the Governor and myself. It was determined
62. Ms. Morris and her attorneys immediately went to the Supreme Court of Minnesota for a
writ of prohibition asking that the district court be restrained from enforcing the order of Judge
Schultz. Subsequent to Judge Schultz's decision on May 14, 1985, Steven Doyle, Ms. Morris'
altorney, was quoted by one of the local radio stations as saying, "It is horrendous that citizens can
he forced to participate in what is essentially an administrative procedure."
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that upon any substantive issue Mr. Gage should speak; however,
the Attorney General's Office would address the actual issue of
whether or not the Governor had the power to grant the
Commission subpoena power.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota acted expeditiously in this
matter and gave an oral decision denying the writ of prohibition
within three days. While we were able then to get on with the
pretrial discovery because of the oral decision, the final written
decision was to cause us some trouble when it was finally issued on
July 19, 1985.63 However, more immediate problems were
pressing.
On May 17, 1985, the Commission held its first prehearing
conference. 64 It was to be an open meeting. Since we had no official
office, the Anoka County Board of Commissioners graciously
allowed us the use of their board room within the courthouse
where I was chambered.
All parties were informed by the Commission that the
Governor had been inclined in his executive order to require a
recommendation within sixty days. Although he did not formally
require a[ recommendation within sixty days, we were acutely
aware of the desire of the Governor to have this matter completed
as quickly as possible. However, since the subpoena issue had just
been resolved, Mr. Gage felt he was unable to answer a number of
questions that would normally be dealt with in a prehearing
65
conference.
We had originally scheduled the hearing to begin on June 3,
1985. As we discussed the matters at the prehearing conference,
however, it became evident that depositions could not be completed
by that date. We finally agreed upon June 7 as the new hearing
date.
Since the Commission had already determined that the
hearing should be open to the public, we discussed the parties'
apprehensions regarding this decision. The primary concern
focused on the use of children's names, and how to protect the
identity of the children. The media was quite willing to voluntarily
63. See Bush v. Perpich, 370 N.W.2d 886, 887 (1985). The Commission encountered a problem
as a result of the court's comments on the role of counsel appointed to assist the Commission. Seeid.
at 188. For a discussion of the problem encountered by the Commission, see infra notes 118-22.
64. The persons present at the first prehearing conference were the following: Mr. Gage,
independent counsel for the State of Minnesota; Mr. Doyle, attorney for Ms. Morris; Mr. Martin,
attorney for Ms. Morris in the federal civil litigation; Wright Walling, an attorney appearing for and
on behalf of nine children involved in the sex abuse cases; and Mark Kurzman, attorney fosr the
petitioner, Cindy Lee Buchan.
65. At the pretrial conference, Mr. Gage was unable to specify whether there would be any
allegations against Ms. Morris other than those contained in the Petition. Furthermore, he was
unable to present a final witness list.
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withhold reporting children's names. Our main problem, however,
was with radio and television live coverage. At first we thought we
would be able to use pseudonyms for the children's names, but then
discovered that we were dealing with some approximately sixty
different children, and pseudonyms would make it nearly
impossible to conduct the hearing properly. That problem was not
completely resolved until, during the hearing, the lawyers, as well
as the witnesses, became very adept at warning the media before
stating a name.
The issue was then raised whether Ms. Morris would be
compelled to testify at the hearing. The Commission adopted the
position that Ms. Morris had to respond to the subpoena since
she would in any civil case. However, in response to specific
questions she would be entitled to the right against selfincrimination pursuant to the fifth amendment of the United.
States Constitution.6 6
In discussing the procedure to be followed, we were able to
locate three of the trial briefs from the four Minnesota cases on
removal. 67 The Commission substantially followed the procedural
approach set forth in those briefs. In each case, a lawyer from the
Attorney General's Office presented the evidence for the petitioner.
Further, in each case, the elected official involved was represented
by at least one if not two or three attorneys who did their own cross
examination as well as their own direct examination of witnesses
called by themselves and the attorney general.
The next issue to be discussed was whether the Special
Commissioners had the power to actually dismiss some charges in
the Petition or, the entire Petition if it appeared that malfeasance
could not be proven. We determined that the Special
Commissioners did not have that power. The Commission was
required pursuant to statute and the Governor's order to gather
evidence and to then report to the Governor, giving
recommendations. 68 According to the statute and our reading of the
removal cases, the only one who could dismiss the Petition would
be the Governor himself. 6 9 We did concur, however, that we should
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67. The brief that we were unable to locate was the one involving the sheriffofScott County. See
In re Olson, 211 Minn. 114, 300 N.W. 398 (1941). We discovered that the brief had been located by
and was being used by Mr. Doyle's office.
68. See MINN. STAT. S 351.04 (repealed 1986) (Commissioner to take and report testimony). For
the text of S 351.04, see supra note 6. See also Minn. Exec. Order No. 85-10 at 2 (1985)
(Commissioner shall report to Governor its findings and recommendations).
69. See MI NN. STAr. § 351.04 (rel etd li't198b). Ftr dir 1(,x of § 351.04, sce supra noi 6. Ye't
Martin v. Burnquisi, 141
generally In re Mason, 147 Minn. 383, 181 N.W. 570 (1920); Siaim rx rel.
Minn. 308, 170 N.W. 201 (1918); State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eherhai(, 116 Minn. 313, 133 N.W. 857
(191 1).
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discuss with the attorneys what evidence there was prior to the
hearing, with the idea that Mr. Gage would not pursue some of the
allegations if there were not facts sufficient to support a finding of
malfeasance.
The question was raised whether the Commission intended to
make a recommendation to the Governor, or, as statute required,
take and report the testimony to the Governor.7 ° Since the
Governor's order asked for a recommendation, and since it hardly
made sense for the Governor to read all of the hearing transcripts
without benefit of the Special Commissioner and Assistant
Commissioners' thoughts, we determined that we would give a
recommendation. We further determined that if the three of us did
not agree as to what those recommendations should be, each of us
would write a separate report. We were, however,in hopes that we
could reach unanimity in the recommendation. Finally, we
strongly believed that the Governor should have the benefit of all of
our expertise in this matter.
Another question discussed at the prehearing conference was
whether there would be two hearings, one before the Commission,
apd a second one before the Governor consisting only of arguments
by attorneys to the Governor. In at least two of the prior removal
cases we were able to conclude from the supreme court briefs that
the attorneys were allowed to make their arguments before the
Governor prior to his final removal decision. We determined that
the Governor's Office should make that choice, after receiving our
recommendation. That, in fact, did not become an issue.
The media and its participation in these hearings was also the
subject of much initial discussion. I had concluded earlier that this
hearing must be as open a forum as possible. There was no
question that the media would be attending. An undecided issue
was whether cameras and recordings in general would be allowed in
the hearing room. We considered the possibility that children
would be testifying, and all of us agreed that the hearing would be
closed if that were to occur. As it turned out, no children testified.
Our biggest problem, hovbever, was the inability during the initial
hearings to keep the names of some of the children from being
broadcast.
The special counsel for the Attorney General's Office had no
objection to cameras in the hearing room, although he believed it
would be easier to conduct the hearing without such distraction.
70. See MINN. STAT. § 351.04 (repealed 1986) (commission to take and report testimony). For
11k.
tcxt of'§ 351.04, see supra note 6.
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Ms. Morris' attorney, on the other hand, was concerned about the
presence of cameras. He feared that many witnesses would be
compelled to testify about sensitive subjects, such as sexual conduct
with their own or other children, or investigations of their alleged
child sexual abuse. Because of this sensitive testimony, Mr. Doyle
believed that cameras would adversely affect these witnesses.
The Commissioners, while recognizing the potential
difficulties, believed strongly in the necessity of openness in the
removal proceedings. We were convinced that the process by which
we reached a recommendation would be as important as the
recommendation itself. Therefore, it was extremely important for
the people of Minnesota to understand that process so that they
could better comprehend our final decision in this matter. In
addition to holding the hearing in an open, public forum, the
electronic media would allow Minnesotans to follow the hearing
more easily.
The problem remained that witnesses might be more fearful
because cameras were present. Also, we still had not resolved the
potential problem of children's names being broadcast. The media
had been very good about protecting the names of children up to
this point. However, we were not sure that coverage could continue
without means to prevent any slips on live coverage that might
occur.
It should be noted that Minnesota does not generally allow
cameras in the courtroom. 71 At the time of the hearing, however,
courts were still experimenting by allowing cameras in certain types
of cases. The Commission was not required to follow the supreme
court ruling on cameras since this was not a court procedure.
Nonetheless, the Commissioners agreed that, since we were using
civil trial rules, perhaps we should follow the order of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota with very few exceptions to ensure that the
hearing would be fair and would not be tainted by overly exuberant
media coverage.
A final concern at the prehearing conference was a broad
restraining order that Judge Robert J. Brunig had issued. The
order precluded out-of-court statements regarding the substance of
any proceedings having to do with Scott County child welfare. A
quick phone call during a conference recess enabled me to speak
with Judge Brunig. He assured me that he only meant to forbid
anyone from testifying about those matters which they had learned
71. (oDE OFJUIICIAL CONDuc'r Canon 3A(7)(1985). The court allowed carnras as long as all
iarhies agreed to their use. Se id. Canon 3A(7)(ii).
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of within a juvenile court hearing. He in no way meant to limit
disclosures of information known independently by witnesses.
It should be mentioned that in most of the twenty-four child
sexual abuse complaints charged in Scott County the child victims
involved were also involved with juvenile court. Therefore, when
the twenty-one cases were dismissed, many of those children and
their families were still under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
and remained so for many months. In fact, some were still under
such jurisdiction at the time we were designing our procedures for
the hearing on removal of Ms. Morris. Consequently, we
frequently dealt with the issue of what work product could be used
from those juvenile court proceedings. Mr. Gage, for example,
wanted a partial transcript of one of the hearings because Ms.
Morris had testified in that particular case. Mr. Gage argued it was
important to review her testimony under oath for possible
impeachment purposes. An in camera review of that portion of the
record was arranged with the juvenile court judge.
Following the May 17, 1985, prehearing conference, the
decisions were summarized in a memorandum so that everyone
would be on notice and be sure to object, if necessary, before the
hearing actually started. At this point, we anticipated that the
hearings would commence onJune 7, 1985. In the memorandum,
written to all counsel and copied to such other counsel as were
peripherally involved, I added a caveat which stated, "Henceforth,
it would be appreciated if none of the Commissioners are
approached on a less than formal basis by any of the counsel either
directly or peripherally involved. We wish to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety, and thank you for your cooperation." I
felt it was necessary to include this statement after one of the
attorneys representing former defendants in the Scott County sex
abuse cases stopped by my chambers one afternoon to discuss with
me his frustration due to his belief that Mr. Gage was not utilizing
information that he felt was important in the removal hearing.
While I believe that this attorney did not recognize he was having
ex parte communication, this was typical of the many different
types of situations we seemed to be encountering while endeavoring
to deal with what was an odd procedure for all of us. While not
clearly ajudicial process, it certainly was similar to one.
Although we had decided to follow civil trial rules, we did not
wish to give the hearings the aura of a courtroom proceeding.
Pursuant to that end, I stopped using my judicial letterhead and
began referring to myself and Julius Gernes and Irene Scott as
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"Commissioners." Up to this point, the lawyers, quite naturally,
had been addressing me as "Judge" or "Your Honor."
As we moved closer to the hearing date of June 7, it became
increasingly apparent that we would not make that deadline.
Nevertheless, certain preparations had to be made well in advance.
Arranging an appropriate hearing room, meeting with media
representatives, and planning for security were the most important
in a long list of details. We were aware that there had been threats
made on Ms. Morris' life. We were concerned, also, that since
anyone could attend the hearing, we might encounter problems
with conflicting special interest groups such as Victims of Child
Abuse Legislation (VOCAL) and Society's League Against
Molestation (SLAM). We were able to secure a hearing room in
the State Office Building next to the state capitol in Saint Paul.
State capitol security agreed to provide security for the hearing.
The initial meeting with the media representatives seemed to go
very well. Following that meeting, I issued an order permitting!
audio and video coverage of the Commission hearings specifying
what the media could and could not do.
There were continuing problems in the conducting of
depositions. For example, I was asked by the special counsel at one
point to rule specifically on whether Mr. Kurzman, the attorney for
Petitioner Cindy Lee Buchan, could attend depositions and receive
copies of the deposition transcripts. Ms. Morris' attorneys
had complained that Ms. Buchan was simply using this removal
hearing to do expedited discovery for her federal civil lawsuit
against Ms. Morris. I had ruled earlier that these depositions were
private and not open to the public. Therefore, since Mr. Kurzman
was not a party to this action nor representing a party to this action,
I ruled that he could not attend nor receive copies of the deposition.
The next problem occurred when Mr. Doyle served notice to
Cindy Lee Buchan for deposition. She refused to attend, stating
that she was having problems with her pregnancy and that the
deposition would be too stressful. Mr. Doyle filed an ex parte
motion in Ramsey County Court, where the subpoenas were
acquired, and he requested an order that Ms. Buchan be found in
contempt of court for failing to attend a scheduled deposition. He
further requested that she be required to attend a deposition and
bring various papers and documents with her. Mr. Doyle stated in
an affidavit that he did not believe Ms. Morris could fully prepare
her defense unless she had the opportunity to take the deposition of
Ms. Buchan, the petitioner who filed for removal of Ms. Morris.
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Within that Petition various acts on the part of Ms. Morris were
alleged. Ms. Morris believed she had a right to depose Ms. Buchan
in regard to those allegations.
Mr. Doyle further submitted affidavits of an investigator with
the State of Minnesota and a detective with the Scott County
Sheriff's Department. Both alleged that they had seen Ms. Buchan
driving an automobile from her home, walking into her house, and
caring for her two children who were in the car. Judge Joseph P.
Summers of the Ramsey County District Court heard the matter
and determined that it was an issue that should be decided by the
Special Commissioner.
A telephone conference was arranged for June 3, 1985, with
Cindy Lee Buchan's doctor to determine exactly what Ms.
Buchan's problems were and whether she might be able to
participate in a deposition. Dr. Luth, Ms. Buchan's obstetrical
gynecology specialist, was of the opinion that since she was having
premature contractions, she should avoid stress as much as
possible. Dr. Luth said he believed that a high-pressure
examination would cause Ms. Buchan stress.
Mr. Kurzman then requested that Ms. Buchan be allowed to
respond to written interrogatories, but I denied his request. I
decided that Ms. Buchan should be deposed with a doctor present.
If she began to feel stressed, and it seemed to be causing her any
problems, the doctor could then recommend that the deposition be
stopped immediately.
Because of various problems with scheduling of depositions,
the hearing was rescheduled toJune 10. On June 5, however, it was
revealed that Ms. Morris was scheduled for depositions in the
federal civil lawsuit for June 10, 11, and 12. The federal district
court was unwilling to change its deposition schedule, and
therefore the hearing was continued toJune 13, 1985.
Mr. Doyle was asked whether his client wished to be present at
the hearing, since there had been comments by her attorneys that
Ms. Morris might not attend the hearing because she did not want
to give the hearing the dignity of her response to petitioner's
allegations. Mr.Doyle responded that Ms. Morris wanted to attend
the hearing. He added that she intended to continue performing
her job as county attorney, so she probably could not be in
attendance during the entire time.
Meanwhile, other concerns were voiced to us by attorneys
representing the children. For example, Wright Walling, a
Minneapolis attorney representing nine children in juvenile court
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matters, was worried that children's names would be mentioned in
the hearing and broadcast over television and radio.7 2 As it turned
out, the children's names were mentioned throughout the hearings
and, in the initial stages, were sometimes accidentally broadcast.
The lawyers were finally able to control that by prefacing the
child's name with the warning, "Child's name coming." They
were also able to coach their witnesses sufficiently in this same
method. After about a week of hearings, children's names were no
longer inadvertently broadcast.
Mr. Walling had also voiced serious concerns about children
testifying at the hearing. The anxiety that Mr. Walling had about
the mental health of his young clients was shared by all of us.
Throughout the hearing, the special counsel, with strong urging
from the Commissioners, did not call any of the children as
witnesses.
An ancillary concern was that adults who had never been
charged with child sexual abuse but whose names were mentioned
in the hearings might be labeled child abusers or other kinds of
criminals. Again, the attorneys stated they could not use
pseudonyms or another system because of the great number of
names, and they would simply have to use the adults' names. I had
already issued an order to the media prohibiting the use of names of
any persons not charged with a criminal offense relating to the subject matter of these hearings. While that prohibition was somewhat
broad, the purpose was to protect people from being labeled child
abusers. The prohibition was also intended to protect the
Commission from being susceptible to libel or slander suits. By
giving the media notice not to publish these names, we had at least
made an effort to keep the names from being published. The media
responded quite well to this prohibition and, as far as I know, did
not publish the names of persons mentioned in the hearings who
had not been charged with child sexual abuse.
The Minnesota Attorney General's Office researched the
question whether any of the participants in the removal
proceedings could be sued for defamation. 13 That office
determined, based on the case law in Minnesota, that any
statements made in the removal proceedings would be absolutely
72. Our major conccrn was with the simulcast I,y vable tcl(ivjsior stations and Minhmsola Public
Radio, which wanted to have live broadcasts of the hearings. Since tie a(torneys were kill it
agreetnent that it would be impiossile io use pseudonytis or some other lorin which would not
idlentify the children directly, we decided io go ahead with thc use ol'their names in thli hearing, bIt
we tmade every cl'lirt to keeptthose names Iroin being broadcast or published outside o lte hearin .
73. See Letter from Jean Boler, Sp-cial Assistant Attorney General, to Honorabli [,yto C.
Olson (June I, 1985).
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privileged and could not be a basis for a defamation action. 74 They
commented, however, that the precautions we had taken were
and might well preclude the issue from
nonetheless well advised
75
even being raised.
Throughout these months of meetings, motions and
organizational problems, Kim Mesun, the Commission's attorney,
had been preparing a memorandum for the Commission on the
definition of malfeasance, which we had all thought in the
beginning was the central issue. It was, of course, but other
matters seemed to have taken center stage during these months
while we were trying to get the hearing ready to commence.
Within the definition of malfeasance found in Black's Law
Dictionary is the following statement: "Comprehensive term
including any wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts or interferes
with the performance of official duties.' '76 Within Minnesota case
law we looked primarily at the cases dealing with removal, but did
find some other cases which had to deal with a malfeasance
standard. What the research indicated was that malfeasance did not
77
appear to be "susceptible of an exact definition."
In State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, the court stated that
conviction of a crime was not essential to show malfeasance. 78 In
State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, we were told that "[t]he misconduct
or malfeasance under our law must have direct relation to and be
connected with the 'performance of official duties,' and amount
either to maladministration, or to willful and intentional neglect
79 The court
and failure to discharge the duties of the office at all. ''
added that malfeasance "does not include acts and conduct,
thought amounting to a violation of the criminal laws of the state,
which have no connection with discharge of official duties.''80
Furthermore, the court in In re Mason determined that malfeasance
occurs when the accused officer has so misconducted himself in
respect to the performance of his official duties that the good of the
public service requires his removal from office. 8
Finally, within Minnesota, the only other direction given to us
was a 1910 Minnesota A'ttorney General's opinion stating that "if
74. See id. at 3; seealso Mathis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 224, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954):
Frcivr v. Independent.School District No. 197, 356 N.W.2d 724, 729 (Minn.Ct. App. 1984).
75. See Letter, supra note 73, at 1.
76. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 862 (5th ed. 1979). Malfeasance is currently defined pursuant to
the Minnesota Statutes as "the willful commission of an unlawful or wrongful act in the performance
of a public official's duties which is outside the scope of authority of the public official and which
infringes on the rights of any person or entity." MINN. STAT. S 351.14(2) (1986).
77. See Jacobsen v. Nagle, 255 Minn. 300, 304, 96 N.W.2d 569. 573 (1959).
Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313, 322, 133 N.W. 857, 861 (1911).
78. State ex rel.
79. StateexrelMartin v. Burnquist, 141 Minn. 308. 322, 170 N.W. 201. 203 (1918).
80. Id.
81. In re Mason, 147 Minn. 387, 391, 181 N.W. 570, 572(1920).
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the standard is malfeasance, the evidence should show a willfull
intent to violate the law" and that "[i]nnocent errors in the
pertormance of the duties of office do not seem to be proper
grounds for removal." 8 2 It was clear that with the research done
within Minnesota we had a need to go outside of the state to find a
clear definition of malfeasance.
After a nationwide computer search, Ms. Mesun found some
3000 cases having to do with malfeasance. She then spent a
considerable amount of time narrowing these cases to malfeasance
for removal of an elected official. Based upon all of this research,
the following defifiition of malfeasance was adopted: "When an
official consciously does an illegal act or a wrongful act which
infringes upon the rights of another to his/her damage, and the act
is outside the scope of the official's authority, that is malfeasance."
Now having determined the definition of malfeasance, the
Commissioners were ready to analyze on three levels the testimony
presented to the Commission. First, we had to analyze whether or
not an allegation had been proved. If an allegation was proved, the
question became whether the conduct amounted to malfeasance.
Assuming that the conduct did amount to malfeasance, we had to
determine whether Ms. Morris should be removed from office
based on those acts of malfeasance.
We were still a long way from hearing enough testimony in a
formal hearing to make a determination as to whether the
allegations had been proved. On June 7, 1985, the Commission
held its second prehearing conference. The hearing was scheduled
to begin on June 13, less than a week away. It was at this
prehearing conference that Special Counsel Gage presented his first
set of additional allegations which were amended to the original
4
petition.
The most important additional allegation was that there was
malfeasance with regard to the dismissal of the twenty-one sex
abuse cases. 85 Mr. Gage stated that he would be unable to prove,
based on what he had learned in depositions, the first allegation of
the original Petition.8 6 The allegation stated that Ms. Morris had
caused the arrest of citizens, knowing there was insufficient
82. Minn. Op. Atny Gen. No. 475-B (May 26, 1910).
83. Mesun, Ma~feasanc, and Nonfeasane ofPublicOffiicia[ , 55 ]Iw Hf.
(March-April 1986).

EIN lA,,.ts 10. 1I,27-28

84. See Notice of Restated Petition and Additional Allegations (July 5, 1985) [hereinafter
Notice of Restated Petitioni. The Restated Petition includes the additional allegations presented by
Mr. Gage at the second prehearing conference. See id.
85, See id. at 3.
86. See Petition to Remove, supra note 1, at 1.
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probable cause existing at the time of the arrest to justify the
issuance of criminal complaints.8 7 Further, Mr. Gage felt he would
be unable to prove the second allegation of the original Petition that
Ms. Morris caused the forcible removal of children from their
parental homes knowing there was no probable cause. 88 Mr. Gage
also stated that he would be unable to prove that Ms. Morris was so
deeply involved in the investigation that, either directly or
indirectly, she caused children to develop false allegations
concerning the sexual abuse of children. 89 Furthermore, Mr. Gage
indicated he would be unable to prove the allegation in the Petition
that Ms. Morris directed the Scott County Human Services
Department to not perform their statutory and regulatory duties
with regard to children and families involved in her investigation
and prosecution.9"
Mr. Gage then went on to present the first of three restated
allegations. The allegation involved the tranferring of some of the
allegations in the original Petition by Cindy Buchan and adding to
that some additional allegations which Mr. Gage and his colleagues
had uncovered during the discovery period in preparation for the
hearing. 91 Some of those allegations were additional specific
allegations with regard to the Scott County sex abuse cases
stemming out of the twenty-four adults originally charged with sex
abuse in that county. 92 There were also some additional charges
which dealt only with Ms. Morris and her functioning in office. 9
One allegation concerning Ms. Morris' functioning in office
was that she had physically and verbally abused employees of her
office. 94 Another was that Ms. Morris had misappropriated public
funds belonging to Scott County and had caused others to
misappropriate Scott County funds. 95 A further allegation was that
Ms. Morris had improperly delegated her discretion as a
prosecutor to local law enforcement officers, establishing a policy
that any person charged with violating the Minnesota driving while
intoxicated law would be prosecuted for that offense regardless of
87. Id.
88. See id. at 2.
89. See id. at 3. The fifth allegation in the Petition alleged that Ms. Morris caused the
development of false allegations by children of sexual abuse by directly, or indirectly through her
staff'and others working under her direction, threatening and coercing the children. Id.
90. See id. The sixth allegation in the Petition alleged that Ms. Morris directed the Scott County
Human Services Department to not perform their duties with regard to families involved in her
investigation and prosecution. Id.
91. See generally Notice of Restated Petition, supra note 84.
92. See generally id.
93. See generally id.
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id.
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the merits of the individual case. 96 This particular allegation was
soon dropped by the special counsel.
Mr. Doyle argued at the second prehearing conference that
special counsel ought not to be allowed to go outside of the original
Petition of Cindy Buchan. He stated that if the information did not
exist to support the allegations in Ms. Buchan's Petition, then other
matters not alleged in the Petition should not be considered by the
Commission. Furthermore, Mr. Doyle argued that it would be
unfair to change the focus of the proceedings from whether Ms.
Morris had probable cause to charge the complaints to whether Ms.
Morris should have dismissed the charges. Mr. Gage responded by
stating that he viewed his task as presenting all evidence he might
find which would indicate malfeasance on the part of Ms. Morris
while in elective office.
Minnesota case law allows the original document or petition to
be amended. 97 In In re Mason, the court stated: "[W]e find no
warrant in the statute for saying that only one charge or set of
charges may be considered, and see no reason why additional
charges may not be presented, either independently of the original
charges or by way of amendment to them." ' 98 Therefore, the
Commission concluded that the Petition could be amended to
include additional allegations.
The suggestion was made that the Commission could require
that Mr. Gage make an offer of proof for some of the allegations to
determine whether the allegations would constitute malfeasance
even if proved. We were concerned, however, that there had to be
sufficient evidence in the record so that the Governor would have
all of the facts before him, since it was the Governor who would
make the ultimate decision whether to remove Ms. Morris.
It had become quite clear that neither side was able to do as
much preparation as either wanted. There were some forty-one to
fifty children involved. Law enforcement personnel included
officers from the City of Jordan, from Scott County, and from the
State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. There were dozens of
professionals such as social workers, assistant county attorneys,
therapists, and medical personnel. Contacting these people for
information was a phenomenal job.
In his investigation, Mr. Gage was becoming familiar with
most of the issues and controversies in this case for the first time.
96. The allegation that Ms. Morris improperly delegated her discretion as prosecutor to local
law enforcement officers was not included in the Restated Petition.
97. See In re Mason, 147 Minn. 383, 387, 181 N.W. 570, 572 (1920). For a discussion ofMason,
see supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
98. Id.
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Ms. Morris, on the other hand, had been personally involved since
the original charging of these cases in late 1983. While the
Commission was concerned that Ms. Morris would have adequate
notice of the allegations against her, we had little sympathy for the
argument by her attorney that she was hearing some of these
allegations for the first time at the prehearing conference.
On June 13, 1985, the three Commissioners were sworn in at
the State Office Building and the hearings upon the Petition to
remove R. Kathleen Morris as Scott County Attorney began. The
first item of business was a notice of motion and motion submitted
to the Commissioners by Mr. Doyle, Ms. Morris' attorney. That
motion was for a continuance of the hearing.
The continuance motion was specifically in response to a
second document which was then proposed and served upon the
Commission and Ms. Morris by Mr. Gage. That document
incorporated the original Petition into a document entitled Notice
of Restated Petition and Additional Allegations. 99 This document
was essentially the same as the Restated Petition presented to all of
us at theJune 7, 1985, prehearing conference.
Mr. Doyle was granted permission to speak in support of his
motion and he argued that the Notice of Restated Petition and
Additional Allegations was being substituted for the Buchan
Petition, and thus was a new petition. He contended that out of the
eleven original allegations of the Buchan Petition, two-thirds of
them were not going to be presented. He further stated that he first
learned specifically of the new allegations when Mr. Gage
presented them orally at the June 7 prehearing conference, which
was conducted less than one week before this hearing began. Mr.
Doyle argued vehemently that while everyone had worked at a high
level of cooperation and intensity in taking depositions of
potential witnesses, it was going to be impossible for him to
properly represent his client. He maintained that in the discovery
depositions he was learning new pieces of information that he had
never heard before and had not had an opportunity to discuss with
his client or with her other lawyer, Mr. Martin. Mr. Doyle also
stated that there were literally tens of thousands of documents in
this case that had to be examined and reviewed. He argued that
since the Commission had decided that the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure should apply, the rules should be applied across the
board. Pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, any
amended complaints in a civil suit would allow the respondent
99. See Notice of Restated Petition, supra note 84, at 1.
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time to respond. 100 Therefore, since there had been amendments in
the Petition as recently as forty-eight hours earlier, Mr. Doyle
believed that he and his client should have some time in which to
respond. He insisted that the changes in allegations essentially
created new charges and that an entire new document had
developed out of the investigation by independent counsel. Mr.
Doyle's final argument was that Ms. Morris was looking forward to
an opportunity to respond to the additional allegations but he could
not advise her or encourage her to do so without preparation.
The additional allegation that Mr. Doyle appeared to be most
concerned about was a charge by Special Counsel Mr. Gage that
Ms. Morris had dismissed all criminal complaints against twentyone defendants on October 15, 1984. These dismissals occurred
when, in Mr.Gage's judgment, the evidence in many of those cases
was sufficient to obtain convictions. Mr. Gage stated that the
reasons for these dismissals were spurious.
After Mr. Doyle finished with his argument for a continuance,
Mr. Gage countered with his argument. He agreed that it had been
an exhausting and difficult schedule during the past two and a half
months, but he asserted that there had been a high level of
cooperation and exchange of information, and he believed that
both he and Mr. Doyle were as well informed as possible. He went
on to state that, in actual fact, if anyone was better prepared, it
would be Mr. Doyle and Mr. Martin. He based his comment on
the fact that Mr. Martin had been representing many of the
defendants in the federal civil rights cases, in which many
depositions had already been taken and voluminous affidavits had
been filed. Although Mr. Gage had seen some of those depositions
and affidavits, he certainly had not seen all of them as had Mr.
Martin. Mr. Gage also argued that he had read less than one tenth
of the material that existed in this case, since there were files
generated by not only the Scott County Attorney's Office but also
the Scott County Sheriff's Office, the Jordan Police Department,
the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension for the State of Minnesota,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These documents had all
been available to Ms. Morris, some as early as 1983. Mr. Gage
argued that Ms. Morris had all of the information about the
additional allegation regarding the dismissal of the child sexual
abuse cases, and that he was simply looking at the information and
reasoning that Ms. Morris did not exercise proper prosecutorial
discretion in dismissing the cases. Mr. Gage asserted that none of
the information should have been new to Ms. Morris.
100. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 15 (1986).
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The additional accusations now encompassed in the Notice of
Restated Petition and Additional Allegations presented on June 13
were as follows: (1) Ms. Morris had physically and verbally abused
employees of her office; (2) Ms. Morris had misappropriated public
funds and caused others to misappropriate Scott County funds; (3)
Ms. Morris had attempted to compel certain defendants charged
with sexual abuse of children to suffer public arrest rather than
surrendering voluntarily to avoid widespread news media coverage
of their arrest; (4) Ms. Morris had violated the constitutional rights
of certain criminal defendants represented by lawyers by arranging
for those defendants to be contacted by a lay person instructed to
obtain statements from them to be used in impending criminal
prosecutions; (5) Ms. Morris had made a statement to the news
media denouncing and criticizing the assumption of innocence; (6)
Ms. Morris had caused Frederick Rgnonti, a Scott County
Sheriff's Deputy, to sign a search warrant application without
personal knowledge of its contents, and then directed the deputy to
present that application to a judge on the basis of his personal
knowledge; (7) Ms. Morris had directed Deputy Rgnonti to file a
police report which falsely stated the date on which the final
investigation began and then she issued a criminal complaint based
upon the police report; (8) Ms. Morris had refused to prosecute a
substantial number of welfare fraud cases investigated and
represented by Deputy Rgnonti because of her hostile feelings
toward him; (9) Ms. Morris had compelled the unfavorable
transfer of Deputy Rgnonti based upon a "personality conflict;"
and'(10) when a public defender had sought a favorable disposition
for one client, Ms. Morris threatened to penalize a second client.°10
Mr. Gage argued that these ten allegations involved comparatively
simple factual settings and that they simply showed breaches of
disciplinary rules or misconduct on the part of Ms. Morris. 102
The Commission denied Mr. Doyle's motion for continuance
but made further rulings. The first was that the formal paper
prepared by Mr. Gage and presented to the Commission and Ms.
Morris on that first day of hearing was to be the final petition and
that those limited issues were the only ones to be presented.
Second, the Commission stated that it would consider a motion
for a recess for a reasonable period of time for preparation of Ms.
Morris' response at the end of Mr. Gage's presentation.
Though the Commission recognized that there might be
additional preparation needed by Ms. Morris' attorney, it
101. See Notice of Restated Petition, supra note 84, at 1.
102. See id.
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remained unconvinced that any of the information presented by
Mr. Gage came as a surprise or was new to Ms. Morris. In
fact, the dismissal of the twenty-one cases was hardly an entirely
new issue, since the Buchan Petition had alleged that Ms. Morris
had misrepresented to court's counsel and to the public that she was
dismissing charges because of an ongoing investigation of great
magnitude, when she knew no law enforcement agency was
conducting any such investigation. This is essentially what Mr.
Gage was alleging. However, he was further stating that those cases
should never have been dismissed based on the reasons given by
Ms. Morris.
After the decision to deny the motion for continuance, Mr.
Doyle then asked for a ten minute recess to consider the options
with his client. After ten minutes Mr. Doyle, Mr. Martin, and Ms.
Morris returned to the hearing room. Mr. Doyle announced that
he and Mr. Martin had advised their client that to proceed in the
hearing would be -inappropriate because Ms. Morris would not
receive a fair and fundamental due process hearing because of their
inability to adequately prepare. Mr. Doyle then stated they would,
therefore, not participate in the proceedings. At that point Mr.
Doyle, Mr. Martin, and Ms. Morris stood up and walked out of
the hearing room.
The hearing then commenced without the presence of Ms.
Morris or her attorneys. Mr. Gage made an opening statement and
went on to call the following five witnesses: Frederick W. Rgnonti,
Scott County Sheriff's Deputy; Thomas J. O'Connor, Scott
County Public Defender; Janet Vogel, Secretary to Ms. Morris;
Deborah Gregor, Clerk-typist in the Scott County Attorney's
Office; and Patricia Buss, a former Assistant Scott County
Attorney.
As the hearing progressed we gradually became aware of some
serious problems which we could anticipate encountering
throughout the hearing without the presence of Ms. Morris and her
attorneys. The first problem occurred with the first witness,
Frederick Rgnonti, when Mr. Gage offered an exhibit
through him. Commissioner Gernes questioned whether the
exhibit was hearsay. Mr. Gage agreed that at this point it probably
was hearsay. Our dilemma was who objects to the exhibit if the
Commission did not object. Also, while we had agreed that
Commission members would have the opportunity to question
witnesses after completion of the attorneys' questions, we had not
anticipated doing all cross examinations. The Commissioners
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certainly were not prepared in any way to do adequate examination
because we had purposely avoided reading or doing any
investigation ourselves with regard to the facts in this matter. By
the end of the day the Commissioners were all quite concerned
whether we would be able to conduct a fair hearing and assure that
all the evidence was competent as required by the statute '0 3 without
the presence and participation of Ms. Morris and her attorneys.
We also questioned the value to the Governor of a recommendation
pursuant to this type of hearing. By the next morning we had
determined that it was necessary for us to grant a continuance to
Mr. Doyle after all. While his legal arguments did not convince us,
his grandstand play had won the day for him.
On June 14, 1985, we commenced the second day of hearings
with an announcement stating,
It has become clear to the Commission, upon reflection,
that without the participation of Ms. Morris and her
attorneys the issues in this proceeding could not be fully
and fairly aired. We have, therefore, determined, as a
matter of fairness to Ms. Morris, to grant a continuance.
In order to guarantee sufficient time to Ms. Morris to
prepare, we are continuing the matter for a six-week
period rather than the thirty-day period initially
requested by her attorneys. The hearing will recommence
at 8:30 a.m., August 1, 1985. We are in recess until that
time.
It was significant that we determined to recess rather than continue
from the moment of Mr. Doyle's motion. That significance was to
become apparent when the hearings recommenced on August 1.
Very shortly after the hearing was recessed, discovery
problems developed. Mr. Doyle sent out interrogatories to Mr.
Gage on June 21, 1985. In these interrogatories Mr. Doyle
requested clarification and specificity for each of the charges
against Ms. Morris. This raised the issue of whether Mr. Gage
could, during this discovery period prior to the recommencement of
hearings, raise new allegations against Ms. Morris. The
Commissioners discussed the matter with the attorneys and
determined that new allegations could be raised but only within a
very brief period of time. The following memo was issued:
103. See MINN. S'rAr. 5 351.04 (repealed 1986). For the text of' 351.04, see supra note 6.
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When the Commission continued the hearing of this
matter it in effect reopened discovery for both parties.
However, so that there will be no further delays of the
hearing, Mr. Doyle shall receive from Mr. Gage's office
no later than 5:00 p.m., Friday, July 5, 1985, written
notice of any further allegations Mr. Gage intends to
present at the hearing. This written notice shall also
include the names of the witnesses Mr. Gage intends to
call at the hearing in attempting to prove new
allegations. 104
An unusual problem arose immediately after Court Reporter
Chris DuSchane had transcirbed the first day's testimony. Section
351.04 of the Minnesota Statutes required that "Each witness shall
subscribe his name to his testimony when the same is reduced to
writing."' 10 5 This obviously is not the typical procedure used in a
civil trial when someone gives testimony. We felt, however, that we
had to follow the statute exactly. 0 6 Therefore, we had to develop a
method to enable witnesses to review their testimony and to sign it
as they would in depositions.
Since there was no order to compel witnesses to travel
anywhere and sign a statement at the request of the attorney who
called them, the question arose whether that testimony would have
to be disregarded if the transcript was not reviewed and signed. We
eventually worked out this difficulty. I announced to each witness
at the recommenced hearing that he or she was still under subpoena
until they had completed the signing of or the subscribing to his or
her testimony. We allowed the witnesses to waive that signing, but
many of them travelled to the court reporter's home where she
was transcribing testimony day and night for the several weeks
following the hearing. This was just another example of a
requirement by a rather antiquated statute which made our job
even more troublesome than it needed to be.
On July 5, 1985, Mr. Gage sent a Notice of Restated Petition
and Additional Allegations to Mr. Doyle and the
Commissioners. 10 7 This was to be the third and final petition by
Mr. Gage. In his cover letter, however, he indicated that he was
still investigating some additional matters, but did not have
sufficient information to determine whether he would be seeking
104.
105.
106.
107.

This memorandum was sent to both Mr. Gage and Mr. Doyle onJune 24, 1985.
MINN. STAT. § 351.04 (repealed 1986). For the text of § 351.04, see supra note 6.
See id.
See Notice of Restated Petition, supra note 84, at 3.
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the Commission's approval to make them part of the Petition. He
expected that this investigation would take approximately one more
week, and stated three separate potential additional charges.
Mr. Gage never requested to add these charges.
On July 19, the Supreme Court of Minnesota filed its opinion
pertaining to the subpoena matter in which R. Kathleen Morris
had requested that Ramsey County District Court be restrained
from enforcing its order on May 15, 1985, which denied Ms.
Morris' motion to quash subpoenas issued requiring attendance at
prehearing deposition testimony. 10 8 Since the petitioners conceded
that the Special Commissioner was empowered to authorize the
issuance of subpoenas to compel testimony, at any hearing pursuant
to section 351.03 of the Minnesota Statutes, Chief Justice Amdahl,
writing for the court, addressed the narrow issue of whether the
Commission's subpoena power permitted the Commission to
compel prehearing deposition testimony.10 9 The Supreme Court of
Minnesota concluded that authority to issue subpoenas was implied
from the ultimate removal power delegated to the Governor by the
legislature. 110 Justice Amdahl noted that procedural mechanisms
are contemplated to accomplish a full investigation of matters
relevant to the inquiry.'11 He further stated that "[t]o the extent
the testimony of individuals whose knowledge is relevant cannot be
voluntarily obtained, the subpoena power must be available" so
2
that a full and complete investigation may be done. "
Justice Amdahl commented on the role of counsel appointed to
assist the Commission. "[A]s defined by the Executive Order,"
Justice Amdahl wrote, the special counsel's duty implied "the
neutral presentation of all evidence for and against the official, not
merely the disclosure of evidence found to support the petition for
removal.'

'

13

The court concluded that the counsel's role was

distinguishable from that of a prosecuting attorney.11 4 The court's
comments on the role of the special counsel were entirely
108. Bush v. Perpich, 370 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1985). The Supreme Court ol Minnesota
orally denied Ms. Morris' motion on May 16, 1985, stating that a written opinion would be filed
subsequently. Id. at 887.
109. Id. at 888; seeMINN. STAT. 5 351.03 (repealed 1986) (governor to make determination upon
competent evidence). For the text of S 351.03, see supra note 6.
110. Bush, 370 N.W.2d at 888.
Il1. Id. The court invited the executive and legislative branches of Minnesota government to
evaluate the need for more definitive and comprehensive procedures for the investigative and
reporting process that is involved in a removal action. Id. at 888-89. Subsequent to the court's
opinion in Bush, the legislature adopted a new procedure for the removal of elected county officials.
See MINN. STAT. 55 351.14-23 (1986). For a discussion of SS 351.14-23, see infra notes 131-34 and
accompanying text.
112. Bush, 370 N.W.2d at 888.
113. Id.
114. Id
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unexpected since neither the State nor Ms. Morris had asked the
court for an opinion or a ruling on Mr. Gage's role in these
removal hearings.
Three justices joined in a dissent on the issue whether
testimony of the couAty attorney under investigation could be
compelled."I5 The three justices disagreed with the majority that
the executive order and section 351.03 of the Minnesota Statutes
116
authorized the compelling of testimony of the county attorney.
Since the statute provided that the governor give "an opportunity
to be heard in his defense" to the elected official charged, these
justices were on to define the word "opportunity" as "chance" or
"option" to testify in her own behalf, and thus found that Ms.
Morris was not required to testify. 1 17
On July 23, 1985, Mr. Doyle brought a motion before the
Special Commissioner to remove Mr. Gage as special counsel in
the removal hearings of Ms. Morris. Mr. Doyle argued that the
Supreme Court of Minnesota had commented that Mr. Gage
should be a neutral investigator and a neutral presenter of all
evidence for and against Ms. Morris.' 18 Since the Commission had
directed him to take on the role of a prosecutor, Mr. Doyle asserted
that Mr. Gage should now be replaced.
The Commission denied Mr. Doyle's motion to remove Mr.
Gage from the proceedings. First, the Commission found it had
selected the proper procedure in line with all the prior removal
cases, and believed that it was the best procedure to afford all
parties maximum due process. Second, the Commission viewed the
comments in the supreme court's opinion as dicta, not a holding,
and certainly not as a directive to the Commission to change its
procedural process." 9 Finally, the statutes under which both the
Governor and the Special Commissioner were operating did not
specify how the hearing should be conducted.120 The statutes
simply provided that the Special Commissioner shall "[t]ake and
report the testimony for and against [the elected official]," and that
the Governor could remove an elected official only upon
"competent evidence...of malfeasance or nonfeasance in the
115. Id. at 889 (Kclley, J. dissenting)..Justices Wahl and Coynt-J ined in ie dissen of.Jus ice
Kelley. Id.
116. Id.: see MINN. STAT. S 351.03 (repealed 1986). For the text ofS 351.03, see supra note 6.
117. Bush, -370 N.W.2d at 889. (Kelley, J., dissenting); see MINN. STAT. 5 351.03 (repealed
1986). For the text of § 351.03, see supra note 6.
118. Bush, 370 N.W.2d at 888.
119. See id.
120. Se? MINN. SrA'r. s 35 1.03-.04 (repcaled 1986). For the text of .. 351.03-.)4, see supra note
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performance of his official duties." 121 In its dicta the supreme court
seemed to look only to the executive order and did not take into
account the Minnesota statutes upon which the Commission
122
relied.
Following our decision to deny Mr. Doyle's motion, we set a
prehearing conference for later in the afternoon so that we could
discuss any anticipated problems, and assure ourselves that the
hearing on the next day, August 1, would actually proceed. In
anticipation of that prehearing conference, the Commissioners
met and determined that we had to more carefully structure the
presentation of the evidence by Mr. Gage. Hence, we sent, a
memorandum to Mr. Gage and to Mr. Doyle with a copy to Mr.
Martin advising the attorneys that when the hearing resumed on
August 1, we intended to begin with a review of the orginal Buchan
Petition. The Commissioners agreed that it was necessary to review
the original Buchan Petition since Mr. Gage was not going to
present some evidence on some of the allegations made in that
Petition. We expected that no matter what recommendation we
gave to the Governor, he would want to know what had happened
to the allegations in that original Petition, since that was the basis
for the executive order. We informed Mr. Gage that we would
require him to explain why he was not going to present evidence on
some of the allegations in the original Petition, if that was the case.
We also asked him to briefly outline the efforts he had made to find
supporting evidence. Upon completion of the review of the Buchan
Petition, we then would read into the record the additional
allegations regarding the Scott County sex abuse cases which were
not specifically included in the Buchan Petition.1 23 At that point
Mr. Gage would proceed with the evidence of malfeasance or
nonfeasance arising from the Scott County sex abuse cases.
If Mr.
Gage deemed
it necessary to introduce
evidence of malfeasance or nonfeasance not related to the Scott
County sex abuse cases, then we would require that he make an
offer of proof to the Commission. We, as a Commission, would
then determine whether such evidence was pertinent and should be
allowed in the hearing. We stated in our memorandum that the
offer of proof need not include testimony, but that it should be quite
complete. That would iticlude, of course, a list of the witnesses and
exactly what Mr. Gage would expect to prove through the
121. Id.
122. See Bush, 370 N.W.2d at 888; see also MINN. STAT. SS 351.03-.04 (repealed 1986). For the
text of SS 351.03-04, see supra note 6.
123. See.generally Petition to Remove, supra note I; Notice of Restatd Petition, supra note 84.
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testimony of these witnesses. The cover letter to this memorandum
clearly stated that we believed the Governor was entitled to have
every allegation in the Buchan Petition addressed as completely as
possible, and therefore, we would require that Mr. Gage begin his
presentation on August 1 with evidence relating to the Scott
County sex abuse cases. We also required that Mr. Gage provide to
Mr. Doyle a list of witnesses which Mr. Gage intended to call on
August 1 and 2.
On July 31, 1985, the three Commissioners met with Mr.
Doyle, Mr. Martin, and Mr. Gage at the State Office Building for
the final prehearing conference. Bailey Blethen, a criminal attorney
and law partner of Mr. Gage who would assist him at the hearing,
was also present. At the prehearing conference the Commission
was assured that Ms. Morris would be present, there would be no
surprise motions, and that all parties were ready to fully
participate.
The hearing was recommenced the next morning with a
statement which the Commission hoped would clear up some
misunderstandings about the purpose and the process of the
hearing. All of those watching were reminded that these
proceedings were started because Cindy Lee Buchan filed a
removal petition with the Governor alleging that R. Kathleen
Morris was guilty of malfeasance in the performance of her duties
as Scott County Attorney. The statement further explained that
once the Governor appointed the Commission, the Commision
intentionally did not investigate the charges because that would
have destroyed its ability to carry out its duty to impartially consider the evidence for and against Ms. Morris. The Commission
went on to explain that it had made the decision that the fairest and
best way to get at the truth while protecting everyone's rights, was
to conduct the hearing utilizing the adversary or trial structure.
Therefore, Mr. Gage, who had been appointed by the Attorney
General's Office to organize and present evidence, had sought
evidence in support of the Petition. He had a duty, however, to
disclose any helpful or favorable evidence to Ms. Morris and her
counsel. We further stated that Ms. Morris was entitled to be
present at the hearings, to be represented by a lawyer of her choice,
and to cross examine the witnesses. Mr. Doyle was introduced as
the attorney appearing on behalf of Ms. Morris.
Finally, it was announced that, as the Special Commissioner,
with the assistance of Irene Scott and Julius Gernes, I was charged
with the responsibility of determining whether there was a basis to
remove Ms. Morris as Scott County Attorney. Once that
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determination was made, I would make a recommendation to the
Governor to either remove Ms. Morris or dismiss the Petition and
the other allegations as being not proved or insufficient for
removal.
At that point in the hearing, I stated that the proceedings
would resume and the Commission would review each of the
allegations in the Buchan Petition with the presenter of the
evidence, Mr. Gage. Each allegation in the original Petition was
then read and Mr. Gage responded to each allegation, declaring
whether he intended to present evidence or whether he had
determined there was insufficient evidence to go forward with that
particular allegation. He then stated the efforts he had made in
order to find supporting evidence. All of the allegations in the
Buchan Petition charging malfeasance were related to the Scott
County sex abuse cases. While Mr. Gage stated he could not prove
every charge in the petition, he indicated that he wished to offer
further evidence of malfeasance or nonfeasance relating to these
same Scott County sex abuse cases. The Commission decided it
would hear the evidence.
Following Mr. Gage's presentation of evidence related to the
sex abuse cases, we explained to persons watching the proceedings
that Mr. Gage also had the responsibility and the obligation to call
to the attention of the Commission any evidence at all of
malfeasance which he uncovered in his investigation of Ms.
Morris, including evidence not related to the sex abuse cases.
Therefore, we would allow Mr. Gage, after all the evidence arising
from the sex abuse cases had been completed, to introduce, first to
the Commission alone, additional evidence of malfeasance. The
Commission then would determine if such evidence was pertinent
and if it should be presented in the open hearing and through
witnesses. 124
For the next two and a half weeks the Commission heard
testimony from witnesses both for and against Ms. Morris,
presented both by Mr. Gage and by Mr. Doyle. Mr. Martin, on
behalf of Ms. Morris, and Mr. Blethen, assisting Mr. Gage, also
participated. Witnesses from Scott County included assistant
county attorneys, financial and social workers, the sheriff and
several of his deputies, police officers from the cities of Jordan and
Shakopee, several judges, attorneys who acted as guardians ad
litem for the children, the stepmother of a victim, and R. Kathleen
124. We anticipated that Mr. Gage would present evidence to the Commission either in the
firm of affidavits or through his own statements. We did not expect that evidence would be presented
through witnesses.
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Morris, herself, called both by Mr. Gage and later by her attorney.
Also appearing as witnesses were former defendants in the sex
abuse cases and other citizens. Therapists, Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension agents, a criminal intelligence analyst, a
television special reporter, and the Attorney General of Minnesota
also testified.
Each witness was examined, and then cross examined. When
both attorneys had completed their questioning of a witness, the
Commissioners would ask any questions they might have.
Following the completion of the Commissioners' questions, the
attorneys were allowed to ask any further questions they might
want to ask on issues raised by the Commissioners. There were
over 200 exhibits entered into evidence, including the entire
transcript from the Bentz trial. It was estimated that there were
some eight to ten thousand pages of documents.
After the completion of testimony specifically dealing with the
Scott County sex abuse cases, the Commission heard from Mr.
Gage, in camera, regarding further allegations he proposed to place
before it. There were seven such charges. Mr. Gage presented six
of those charges, withdrawing the seventh allegation that Ms.
Morris misappropriated public funds. Some of the testimony on the
remaining six allegations had already been completed on June 13,
1985, when Ms. Morris and her attorneys chose to absent
themselves from the hearing after being denied a continuance. The
following day the Commission announced it would recess the
hearings, thus, allowing all testimony that first day to stand.
Therefore, Mr. Gage was requesting only to call certain witnesses
to bolster his five charges with regard to Deputy Rgnonti and to the
charges of verbal and physical abuse by Ms. Morris towards her
staff and other Scott County employees. The Commission decided
that this additional evidence appeared necessary and pertinent for a
full airing of any possible malfeasance by Ms. Morris while acting
as Scott County Attorney. After the completion of all the testimony
Mr. Doyle and Mr. Gage each gave a closing argument. The
hearings ended and the Commission retired to complete its task.
Away from the persistant energy of the hearing, the task
appeared overwhelming in scope. It was essential to develop a
system by which the Commission could review the evidence. We
began by separating each allegation in the July 5 Revised Petition,
and discussing them one by one to determine whether they had
been proved by clear and convincing evidence. Some clearly had
not been. Others appeared to be sufficiently proved. After
discussion, we began writing findings for the questionable and the
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clearly proved charges. That required reading through all of the
documents and reviewing the testimony as it was being transcribed.
Every finding was cited to a document or a transcript page number.
We were determined to make this report as thorough and accurate
as possible.
After completing forty pages of findings on twelve of the
allegations, we concluded that seven of them were proved, four
were not proved by clear and convincing evidence, and there was
no basis for one of the allegations. The next analysis was to decide
whether the seven allegations which were proved amounted to
malfeasance. In making this determination we used a method of
analysis developed from the definition of malfeasance which we had
adopted after considerable research. 2 5
We analyzed each act which we found proved with the
following questions. First, we asked whether Ms. Morris willfully
did a specific act, and, if she did, whether it was done consciously,
voluntarily, and without coercion or duress. Second, if we
answered the first question yes, then we asked whether the act was
wrongful. In order to answer that question properly we needed to
further define "wrongful."
Black's Law Dictionary defines
"wrongful" as injurious, heedless, unjust, reckless, unfair acts
which would infringe upon the rights of another to his or her
damage. 126 We determined that, in other words, someone must be
damaged even if that someone was society in general. Third, if the
answer to the second question was yes, we asked whether Ms.
Morris had the right to do the act. Was it within the scope of her
official duty or official authority to act in this way? For example,
was it within her prosecutorial discretion? Finally, if the answer to
the third questions was no, we asked whether the doing of the act
interfered with the performance of her job. The purpose of this
question was to avoid trivial allegations or acts which had no
connection with the discharge of her official duties. With an
affirmative response to this final question, malfeasance was
established.
Using the above analysis on the seven allegations that were
proved we concluded the following:
1. Ms. Morris failed to disclose to the trial judge that child
witnesses were being housed together during a trial in
which they were witnesses. We determined that R.
125. See Mesun, supra note 83, at 10.
126. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1446 (5th ed. 1979).
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Kathleen Morris had no duty to disclose this information
to the judge, although a prudent prosecutor would have
done so. Therefore, we found no malfeasance.
2. Ms. Morris stated to the trial judge on the eighth day
of the Bentz trial that the defendants never asked for the
notes of the investigating officers when, in fact, defense
counsel had specifically requested such notes. However,
given the fact that the judge recalled that defense counsel
had requested such notes and those notes were
subsequently delivered during the trial to defense
counsel, no damage was done. Therefore, because no
damage was done, the Commission concluded that this*
was not malfeasance.
3. Ms. Morris struck physically at and verbally abused
employees of her office and used intemperate and abusive
language toward other Scott County employees. While
her conduct, particularly toward those who worked for
her, was reprehensible, it did not, the Commission
concluded, constitute malfeasance since it did not
interfere with the discharge of her official duties.
4. Ms. Morris made a false statement to the media when
she said that children who were alleged victims of sex
abuse in the Scott County cases were not subject to
dozens of interviews. Even if one interprets this to mean
only investigative interviews, the Commission did find
that there were at least ten children who had more than a
dozen interviews each with investigators. More than half
of those children had almost or more than two dozen
interviews. Those numbers did not inqlude the additional
interviews with therapists, psychologists, and with Ms.
Morris and her staff. Though no records were retained by
Ms. Morris, a guardian ad litem documented the number
of court preparation interviews the County Attorney's
Office had with two children as high as nineteen and
fourteen interviews each. The Commission, however, did
not find that the false statement made to the media
amounted to malfeasance because it was not established
who was damaged by these statements, except the public
in a general sense.
5. Ms. Morris dismissed all criminal complaints against
twenty-one defendants in the Scott County sex abuse
cases on October 15, 1984, even though she believed that
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the cases had been properly investigated, that there was
probable cause to charge, and that the cases had been
properly prepared for trial and could be successfully
prosecuted. Many individuals who were not allowed the
opportunity to clear their names were greatly damaged by
this decision, as was society's interests in seeing justice
done. This act certainly interfered with the performance
of Ms. Morris' official duties. However, a prosecutor has
broad discretion in deciding whether to dismiss a case.
The Commission determined that the evidence presented
to it did not establish to a clear and convincing standard
that Ms. Morris exceeded this prosecutorial discretion.
The Commission concluded that the wholesale dismissal
of the twenty-one cases was unjustified, but it could not
find that this action constituted malfeasance. The county
attorney or any prosecutor under our system of justice has
such broad prosecutorial discretion that the power to
dismiss cases without regard to whether a conviction
could be secured is practically absolute.
Although our analysis led us to conclude there was no
malfeasance in five of the proved allegations, we did go on to find
that the final two charges proved were, in fact, malfeasant acts. The
first charge proved that we determined was a malfeasant act
was the intentional suppression by Ms. Morris of exculpatory
evidence in the form of statements by children who were witnesses
in the sex abuse cases that they had seen persons being mutiliated
and murdered. These statements, which in most cases were
extremely bizarre, were relevant to the credibility of those children
as witnesses, and Ms. Morris admitted she was aware that others
could consider such statements exculpatory. Furthermore, the
Commission reasoned, even if Ms. Morris thought her choice to
suppress this evidence was valid, she had a clear duty to apply to
the court for a protective order rather than make a nondisclosure
determination on her own. The damage done by this act was to the
integrity of the criminal justice system. It was certainly outside the
scope of her authority to act in this manner, and it was an
interference with the proper discharge of her official duties.
The second malfeasant act Ms. Morris was determined to
have committed was the violation of a court's order sequestering
witnesses in the child sex abuse trial of Robert and Lois Bentz. The
Commission decided that while it was reasonable to house the child
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witnesses together during the Bentz trial, Ms. Morris had a duty,
because of these special arrangments, to make both the children
and the adults involved aware of the sequestration order. The
Commission learned that at least one adult was not aware of the
order, and numerous child witnesses discussed their testimony with
each other, stating they did not know that was not allowed. She also
had a responsibility to see to it that her own behavior was above
reproach. She did not do this when she commended a child witness
in front of all of the other children at a restaurant the evening after
he testified and told everyone to give him a hand. Ms. Morris was
clearly in violation of the sequestration order for the State's
witnesses. The damage again was to the integrity of the criminal
justice system as well as potentially to the State's case.
Having found malfeasance in two of the allegations which
were proved, the Commission then had to determine whether we
should make a recommendation to the Governor to remove Ms.
Morris from her elected position as Scott County Attorney based
on these two malfeasant acts. Section 351.03 of the Minnesota
Statutes certainly provides the Governor with discretion in this
remove.1 27
"may"
decision stating that the Governor
Consequently, the Commission had to analyze carefully whether
it should recommend to the Governor to exercise his discretion
and remove Ms. Morris from office.
Research revealed a generally accepted principle that the
12 8
removal of an official from an elective office is a drastic remedy.
This action is an intervention in the processes of democracy and it
is an infringment on the fundamental principle that the right of
choosing and repudiating public officials belongs exclusively to the
electorate. 12 9 The Commission determined that the removal
process is particularly difficult when an elected official is required
to pass judgment to remove another from elective office. Because of
the great weight of the consequences of removal, both to Ms.
Morris and to the electorate who had chosen her, the Commission
determined that the acts constituting malfeasance had to be so
serious as to result in severe damage to an aggrieved party before
the Governor would be justified in removing her. Thus, our next
and final step in this now extremely lengthy process was to examine
the amount of damage caused by Ms. Morris as a result of her
malfeasant conduct.
We first assessed the degree of injury to the defendants and to
127. SeeMINN. STAT. S 351.03 (repealed 1986). For the text of S 351.03, see supra note 6.
128. SeeEvans v. Hutchinson, 158 W. Va. 359,-, 214 S.E.2d 453, 464(1975).
-, 407 P.2d 571, 574 (1965).
129. See State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190,
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the integrity of the criminal justice system caused by the
withholding of potentially exculpatory evidence. Two events
occurred which directed the Commission to the conclusion that the
degree of injury was not severe enough to justify a recommendation
to remove. The first event was the rulings made by the trial judge.
Although the judge relied only on Ms. Morris' account, he
eventually joined in allowing these statements of the children
regarding murders and mutilation to be suppressed. Therefore,
even when the statements were brought to the attention of the
court, although with no help from Ms. Morris, the result was the
same as that caused by Ms. Morris' malfeasant act. Thus, the
degree of damage to the integrity of the criminal justice system was
overshadowed by the subsequent actions of the trial judge.
The second event was the acquittal by jury of Robert and Lois
Bentz. The lack of the exculpatory evidence did not prevent the
defendants being adjudged not guilty by their peers. Hence, the
damage to them was not significant.
The Commission next assessed the degree of injury wrought
upon the criminal justice system and the State's case by Ms.
Morris' violation of the sequestration order during the Bentz trial.
It appeared to the Commission that Ms. Morris' failure to caution
her witnesses resulted in the children discussing their testimony
among themselves. A reading of the Bentz trial transcript revealed
that such lack of sequestration bolstered the defense case and
damaged the credibility of the children as witnesses. However,
when the violation of the order was brought to the attention of the
trial judge, he ruled that the children's testimony was not tainted
and did not allow their testimony to be stricken. Therefore, it was
impossible for the Commission to assess just how much damage
Ms. Morris' malfeasant act caused to her case in which she was
eventually unsuccessful. Thus, in both malfeasant actions by the
Scott County Attorney R. Kathleen Morris, the Commission
reluctantly had to find that there was not the high degree of
resultant damage necessary to recommend her removal.
In the action where we did find that high degree of damage,
the wholesale dismissal of twenty-one sex abuse cases in one day,
we were foreclosed from finding malfeasance. For the Commission,
that was the most troublesome of all the allegations. As we stated in
our report to the Governor: "Those defendants who were guilty
went free, and those who were innocent were left without the
opportunity to clear their names. Those children who were victims
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became victims once again." 130
Upon receipt of our Commission Report, the Governor
accepted our recommendation and did not remove the county
attorney from her office. On October 10, 1985, at a press conference
to announce his decision, the Governor stated that he would not
remove R. Kathleen Morris but would let the voters of Scott
County decide her fate.
Subsequently, on November 4, 1986, the Scott County
electorate removed R. Kathleen Morris overwhelmingly from
office by a vote of 2-1 in favor of her opponent.
Subsequent to the removal proceedings, the Minnesota
Legislature adopted a new procedure for the removal of elected
county officials. 13 1 I participated in that process by helping to write
the new statute and by testifying to the Legislature. The
Legislature incorporated the definitions for malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance constructed by Kim Mesun and
applied by the Special Commission during the R. Kathleen Morris
removal proceedings. 132 In addition, the Legislature adopted many
of the standards and procedures employed by the Special
Commission. 33 However, the Governor no longer has a role in the
removal process, and the final decision to remove an elected county
official is by a majority vote of the registered voters pursuant to a
134
special election.
130. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the Special Cominission
established by Executive Order 85-10 concerning Kathleen Morris, Scott County Attorney at 53
(1985).
131. See MINN. STAT. SS 351.14-23 (1986) (establishing procedures for the removal of elected
officials).
132. See id. 5 351.14. Malfeasance is defined as the willful commission of an unlawful or
wrongful act in the performance of a public official's duties which is outside the scope of the authority
of the public official and which infringes on the rights of any person or entity. Id. Nonfeasance is
defined as the willful failure to perform a specific act which is a required part of the duties of the
public official. Id. Misfeasance is defined as the negligent performance of the duties of a public
official or the negligent failure to perform a specific act which is a required part of the duties of the
public official. Id.; see also Mesun, supra note 83, at 10.
133. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 351.14-.23 (1986).
134. Id. The newly enacted removal procedures pursuant to the Minnesota Statutes provide that
any registered voter may submit a petition to the county auditor requesting the removal of an elected
county official. Id. 5 351.16. The petition must include the supporting signatures of at least 25% of
the number of persons who voted in the preceding election for the office held by the county official
named in the petition. Id. If the petition contains the requisite number of signatures, the petition is
forwarded to the chief justice of the appellate courts, who is to determine whether the petition
properly alleges facts which, if proven, constitute malfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance of
official duties. Id. 55 351.16-.17. If the petition properly contains factual allegations of malfeasance
or nonfeasance, the chiefjustice shall assign a special master to take evidence at a public hearing. Id.
5 351.17. The special master shall determine whether the petitioners have shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the factual allegations of misfeasance or nonfeasance are true, and if so,
whether the facts found to be true constitute malfeasance or nonfeasance. Id. 5 351.19. If the special
master determines that the elected county official committed malfeasance or nonfeasance in the
performance of official duties, the special master shall order a removal election. Id. § 351.20. An
elected county official.may be removed pursuant to the special election by majority vote. Id. S
351.22.

